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Abstract 
A fundamental change is taking place in the global economy, and the standoff in 
the Doha Round has raised many questions about the World Trade Organization’s 
troubled architecture (Khor, 2009). So far, the quest for renewed policy coherence 
in the rules-based multilateral system has produced stalemate rather than reform. 
The analysis that follows explores the proposition that, without the metaphoric 
‘knife at its throat’ to shock it to its senses, the WTO will continue in the short term 
to be trapped by its existing architecture. There is no coherent reform-minded 
movement supported by a critical number of states to instigate a change in the way 
the WTO does business. The paper looks at the following idea: with many states 
pursuing new policy frames to enhance their strategic interests, the second life of 
the WTO will be dramatically different from the present configuration. A lengthy 
trade pause is a certainty. Four options of what the WTO will become are examined. 
The conclusion is that as a governance body the WTO faces gradual and likely 
irreversible decline. It will have a smaller remit, be prone to mini-multilateralism 
and have to learn to live with a proliferation of regional trade agreements. 
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Introduction 
A fundamental change is taking place in the global economy, and the standoff in 
the Doha Round has raised many questions about the World Trade Organization’s 
troubled architecture (Khor, 2009). So far, the quest for renewed policy coherence 
in the rules-based multilateral system has produced stalemate rather than reform. 
The analysis that follows explores the proposition that with its narrowly cast rules, 
the organization charged with a mandate of global trade governance has not been 
able to evolve into an institution of the twenty-first century.1  
If anything, the gap between aspirations for reform and the stalled Doha Round has 
grown larger. Without the metaphoric ‘knife at its throat’ to shock it to its senses, 
the WTO will continue in the short term to be trapped by its existing architecture. 
The second life of the WTO will be dramatically different from the present 
configuration. It will have a smaller remit,  be prone to mini-multilateralism and will 
have to learn to live with a proliferation of regional trade agreements. How did we 
arrive at this point of no return? 
 
This paper sets out to answer this question and looks at the following ideas: first, it 
examines the way globalization has dramatically evolved as the golden era of 
export-led growth unwinds and challenges the way the WTO conducts its 
negotiations.  In the aftermath of the global financial crisis, the WTO’s member 
countries have not waited for the organization to rethink the state-market 
problematic. Countries around the world have demonstrated that they are ready to 
use any means available to protect their industries from the devastating 
consequences of a contracting world economy. As well new empirical evidence from 
Simon Evenett (2007) demonstrates that the welfare gains from the Doha Round 
are paltry or negative for many countries from the global south. Secondly, it 
examines the internal barriers of its legal and institutional culture standing in the 
way of the WTO finding a new direction. The paper demonstrates the importance 
for the WTO of institutional problem solving; particularly when designing a 
development strategy with a focus that includes public health and education that 
requires an unconventional response. It also explains that the unprecedented 
judicial power of the WTO only partly resides in its Appellate arm. The real power 
lies in the legalization of best- practice expectations for governments as part of the 
Single Undertaking. The consequence is that there has been little room for a culture 
of adaptive legal exceptionalism to emerge. The final section examines what is next 
for this member-driven organization?  How should it redefine its mission? Where to 
now?  Four possible outcome scenarios for the future of the WTO  are examined. All 
have very dissimilar implications for a modern trade policy and global governance. 
In the interminable Doha Round, trade negotiators find themselves boxed in by 
these new dynamics. They can no longer simply focus on the technocratic details of 
striking a deal aware that they will ultimately have to sell the final package to 
doubting publics. 
 
1. The World Trading System In Turmoil 
So far, the WTO has failed to learn by doing and take significant steps to reform its 
work style and decision-making processes. Strong member advocacy to alter the 
institutional status quo has been very weak. There is no visible member support for 
either a bottom-up or top-down redesign of the WTO’s institutional structures that 
                                                 
1 I use the term ‘global south’ somewhat loosely as both geographic metaphor and historical fact to 
describe a very diverse group of countries, at sharply different stages of development, who see 
themselves as a bloc of countries with different interests than the global north -- the advanced 
economies of the globe.  
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would push it in a public interest direction. To this point the WTO’s legal culture has 
been unable to experiment with new policy initiatives or introduce a flexible trade 
agenda because of what Steger calls ‘the GATT bias for template solutions.’  It 
follows an agenda of single best practice, strict rule interpretation, a smaller role for 
the state in economic management, and above all, market access enhancement, all 
goals that were largely the product of the neoliberal Washington Consensus.  By 
comparison  both the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB) 
have tactically distanced themselves for the time being from the neoliberal policies 
of the recent past; recognizing the necessity for global financial reform and the re-
regulation of global financial markets. ( see accompanying table below) In Philip 
Cerny’s words, “the processes of restructuration have moved the organizations 
from a homogenous and tightly woven model to one of increased adaptation” 
(2009).2  
 
2. The New Idea Universe 
 
  Restructuration and Structural Coherence 
 
WTO Normative Practice World Bank Rebalancing Remit 
Single best practice New role for the state 
Strict rule interpretation Policy experimentation e.g. capital 
controls 
Smaller role for the state Rebalancing social agenda and markets 
Broadening market access Problem solving, risk assessment,  
Institution-building 
   
 
Legal monitoring and enforcement Incremental adaptation and ad hoc 
response to the crisis 
Source: Drache, 2010 
 
 
For many observers, the WTO’s ‘bloated trade agenda,’ in Diana Tussie’s acerbic 
words (Tussie 2009?), and the legal straight jacket of single undertaking (its 
outmoded one-size-fits-all legal framework) are reasons enough to require major 
surgery. In particular, three imbalances stand out for much comment from a socio-
economic point of view. The WTO has a strong, effective, and binding dispute 
resolution system “coupled with weak, ineffective political decision-making 
procedures” (Steger 2008, 707). Secondly, its practices are grounded in a deep 
distrust of domestic politics and the belief that without the legal constraints of the 
WTO, protectionism would be rampant (Pauwelyn, 2008, 560). Thirdly, globalization 
today requires ‘strategic non-trade flanking policies’ – policies around human rights, 
environmental sustainability, and industrial practice that will safeguard local 
development and domestic policy space (Pauwelyn, 2009). Paradoxically, while 
                                                 
2 The WTO organizes each autumn a major conference on topical themes such as trade and the 
environment, gender and even reform of its trade architecture. Despite all the papers and panel, as one 
ambassador noted, “it’s all talk and nothing ever comes of it.” Up to the present, there is little evidence 
that the WTO is planning for a post-neoliberal order that, among other things, will require a long-term 
perspective on a reformed trading order. Its website is not at the centre of an engaged policy debate 
when compared to the ICTSD (International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development) and the 
South Centre (An Intergovernmental Policy Think Tank about Developing Countries) in Geneva and The 
Brookings Institution in Washington, DC -- all are knee-deep in a policy world of sustained analytical 
thought. 
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WTO members support human rights conventions and take measures to correct 
market failures, these critical public policy areas lay outside of the WTO’s 
institutional remit.  
 
3. The Keynesnian Correction 
To correct these structural deficits, trade politics for the 21st century require a very 
different global governance institution -- one capable of handling complex and 
challenging issues (Roadnight and Higgott, 2008). In the aftermath of the global 
financial crisis, the WTO’s member countries have not waited for the organization to 
rethink the state-market problematic. Countries around the world have 
demonstrated that they are ready to use any means available to protect their 
industries from the devastating consequences of a contracting world economy. 
Governments are gaining valuable experience managing structural change, and the 
state is no longer missing in action in either the global south or north. It is in full 
throttle with a newfound presence in leading jurisdictions. It is useful, for 
comparative purposes, to see how far the dynamics of state-market relations have 
changed since the currently stalled Doha Round was launched a decade ago. The 
need to map new state practices and take account of new policy communities as 
well as the need for far-reaching institutional stabilization and re-regulation has 
shifted the focus of trade politics from deepening market access to getting the 
institutional response right (Rodrik, 2007). It important to look at some of these 
developments very briefly. 
 
Figure 1: Global Demand Management:Costs and Consequences  
 
The Policy Importance of Rule-Bending Rescue Measures  
 Trade Leverage Multiplier effect Bad effects 
Stimulus package 
 
High Very High Debt Overhang  
Wage subsidy 
 
Moderate to High High Smallish Difficult 
to Phase Out 
Industrial subsidy 
 
High Strong Unclear and 
Difficult to End 
Innovation 
 
Low Weight Unclear Low for the 
Moment 
Capital controls 
 
Effective for 
Brazil 
Across The 
Financial Industry 
Negligible 
Quotas/ 
antidumping 
Small and Merit 
Tracking 
Neutral One offs Subject 
To National 
Interest and 
WTO discipline 
Credit 
Expansionary 
Policies 
Strategic and 
Very Focused For 
Both Private And 
State Enterprises 
Large and 
Continuous For 
Corporations and 
For Offsetting 
GDP Contraction 
Loans and 
Bailouts Leave A 
Decade of 
Legacy Costs 
Source: Drache 2009 
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Many of the new state policies that WTO member states have adopted since 2008 
seem to be strongly Keynesian in inspiration. These include: state aids to take 
workers off the unemployment lines (wage subsidies in Germany, France and 
Netherlands); massive bailouts of near failed banks and investment firms (Eurozone 
and United States ); deficit spending and macro stimulus packages to restore 
consumer demand and battered industries (Eurozone, China, and the United 
States); and new programs and initiatives to strengthen social benefits, reduce 
poverty and protect the most vulnerable from the global chaos (Brazil and France) 
(IMF, April 2009).  
 
Other forms of intervention have been more conventional. States have a battery of 
policy instruments with which to protect their industries and work forces ranging 
from quantity restrictions such as import quotas, export limitations, and voluntary 
export restraints, to regulatory restrictions such as domestic content requirements, 
sanitary and phytosanitary requirements, and safety and health regulations. 
Restrictive rules vary widely and cover every domain of public policy (Trebilcock 
and Howse, 2005). Rules and regulations restricting foreign investment in the 
national interest or on grounds of national security are another critical front-line 
area of state regulation. Currency management is a formidable weapon with which 
to gain a competitive edge over trading partners in difficult economic times. For 
instance, China has relied on a devalued currency to lower the cost of its exports 
and thereby increase market share; such undervaluation is referred to as dumping 
or tough competitive practices. The danger here is that during times of high 
unemployment, currency misalignment can escalate into a full-scale trade war – 
witness rising China-United States tensions due to the under-evaluation of the 
Chinese Renminibi. 
 
4. Rule-Bending in Un-normal Times: Both Choice and Necessity 
None of these innovative measures, however, has impacted the way the WTO 
understands the role of the state in the global economy. For example, its broad 
interpretation of subsidy rules continues to restrict the ability of governments to 
use subsidies for many legitimate purposes (Lester, 2010). The rediscovery by 
governments of these rule-bending rescue measures implemented to shore up the 
economy after the collapse of financial markets has been nothing short of dramatic. 
Despite this, we still do not have a sophisticated theory of the role of the state in 
the current phase of globalization, and there is still a propensity to conflate 
legitimate government intervention with the trade distorting use of subsidies and 
other measures.  
Importantly, governments everywhere continue to rely on the tax system, 
competition policy, state enterprises, social policy, technology, and research policy 
to hold back the full play of free trade dynamics (Hollingsworth and Boyer, 1997). 
One of the consequences of effective demand management is that it requires a 
much more innovative  role for the state . With the passage of the Lisbon Treaty in 
2009, the European Union’s process of integration with its large social market 
serves as a positive model for many other regions particularly Brazil. The Indian 
government has notably deepened its rudimentary welfare state with the passage 
of the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee. It has guaranteed 
each family in the rural sector more than one hundred days of paid work yearly at a 
minimum rate established by the central government (Dailami and Masson, 
2009).So the question is, will these new domestic power dynamics transform the 
multilateral agenda of trade governance and push the WTO in new and challenging 
directions (Zakaria, 2008)? 
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In the crisis, countries found a way to use ‘protection-like’ policies to deal with the 
exceptional circumstances not to choke off trade. 3 Unmanageable surges in 
imports, calamitous price rises in basic food items, currency spikes, and other 
structural and cyclical ‘disasters’ have forced states to bend, and sometimes flout, 
the WTO rule book, which is opposed in principle to the use of subsidies and rescue 
packages. It would help to have better WTO rules governing the use of state 
subsidies, rescue packages, and final bailouts, but it is unlikely that there will be 
any new framework agreement. Simon Lester looked at the current draft of the 
revision to WTO subsidies (TN/RL/W/236) and found that it still does not allow 
governments to rescue industries in a crisis (IELP, 2009). He proposes an 
exemption for situations where imports have caused harm to domestic markets or 
world markets. So far, even this modest proposal is not part of the negotiations. 
Even if there is a ‘Doha-lite agreement’ sometime after 2012, the legal and political 
boulders on the path to the reform of subsidies and other interventionist measures 
are formidable. (See figure 2 Bending the Rules in Un-Normal Times)  
  
Figure   2 Bending the rules in un-normal times 
 
The extended range of modern protection (ist) practices             
 A Selected List of Measures       
 
Difficult  
 
Contentious 
 
Most Controversial 
 
Stimulus packages 
 
Anti-dumping duties 
 
Import quotas 
Wage subsidies Countervail duties Customs and barriers 
Packaging/labelling Industrial Policy Beggar-thy-neighbour 
tariff walls 
Tech. licensing restrictn Currency Devaluation Voluntary export 
restraints 
Industry rescue $$ State Aids/subsidies Export Bans 
Food/health standards Unilateral safeguard 
action 
 
Bailouts Buy America  
Source: Drache 2009 
 
5. Power Asymmetries and Getting Institutions Right 
The fact that the WTO has been unable to find a new direction requires a better 
understanding of the case for institutional problem solving. Problem solving is a 
critical activity encouraging member states to co-operate for common goals on 
demanding issues and to devise innovative solutions and the realistic means to 
achieve them. On economic issues, the primary necessity is to rebalance the free 
trade imperative for global market deepening with non-trade issues such as human 
rights, the environment, and public health. Global institutions with problem-solving 
capacity can establish new norms and practices in order to scale up investment in 
the social market, education, and industrial development. Fernand Braudel (1980) 
                                                 
3 In light of the need for legitimate government intervention, we can analytically distinguish between 
modern forms of social protection. Mercantilist protectionism is designed to put the boots to one’s 
trading partners and choke off exports. The most toxic of these beggar-thy-neighbour tariff walls is the 
indiscriminate use of quotas. Other measures such as safeguards, anti-dumping, state aids and 
subsidies, while contentious and subject to retaliatory action, are legal and long established.   
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put his finger on the conditions for radical and incremental change: an institution 
defined by both ‘traditionalism and rigidity,’ cannot respond to the new political and 
structural realities taking place in the world today. Nor can it readily put itself back 
into the game because it cannot rebalance its decision-making processes with a 
new mandate. Critically absent from the institutional culture of the WTO are 
change-oriented structures as well as the need to reach out to social actors to be 
part of a new consensus..    
 
Conceptually we can identify the step that the WTO ought to take even if it recoils 
from that. It makes sense for the WTO to shift focus from getting the prices right to 
getting the institutions right. Rodrik (2007) notes that socially advantageous 
institutions provide “security of property rights, enforce contracts, stimulate 
entrepreneurship, foster integration in the world economy, manage risk-taking” and 
most importantly, manage the trade adjustment process. For him, the most 
important institutions boosting momentum for growth and providing protection 
from global shocks are:  
1. Creating institutions for property rights and contract enforcement;  
2. Regulating institutions to deal with externalities, scale economies, 
informational incompleteness; 
3. Market stabilizing institutions for monetary and fiscal management;  
4. Legitimizing institutions for social protection and insurance; redistributive 
policies; institutions of conflict management, and social partnerships 
(Rodrik, 2002). 
He rightly adds that while creating, protecting, and solidifying these institutions 
takes time, structural problems are always easier to solve under conditions of 
robust economic growth rather than stagnation. The strength of institutional 
diversity and localism are “the most important determinant for long-term growth.” 
A range of policies such as trade protection, temporary monopolies, subsidized 
credits, and tax incentives often go hand-in-hand with strategies for industrial 
growth and diversification. The subsidies provided by governments, often for 
developmental purposes, are essential to recovering the high costs of innovation. 
Yet many of these practices do not square with the conventional understanding in 
the halls of power in Geneva of what constitutes ‘best practice’ in terms of its codes 
and discipline.   
 
In order to better equip countries to deal with heightened inequality and 
environmental degradation, he believes it is important to return to a ‘thin’ model of 
globalization with less focus on international discipline to harmonize state policies to 
a single best practice. Designing such a growth strategy is much more difficult than 
implementing typical integration policies. The reason for this is that a growth 
program requires in turn two very different ideas.  
 
The first requirement is an investment strategy to kick-start growth to higher but 
sustainable levels, and the second, an institution-building strategy to strengthen 
the economy’s resilience in the face of global volatility and adverse shocks. The 
developing world would be better off with a thin set of rules that promote 
“collaborative strategies to foster entrepreneurship and institution building” (Rodrik, 
2002). The Doha Round is problematic because its ‘thick’ rules aim at maximizing 
trade and investment flows at the expense of policies that would promote more 
experimentation and a broad agenda of institutional reform.  
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6. Global Structural Change and the Rise of the Rest: A New Division of 
Labour 
Trapped by these dynamics, the world’s trade authority has not had the ability up 
until now to take a hard look at itself. Organizations evolve and adapt to structural 
change most often incrementally, but sometimes, faced with a near-death 
experience an organization will address the basic question of its survival. With the 
metaphoric knife at its throat, it has to go into survival mode.   
 
So far there is no sign of that the WTO brass believes there is a crisis that demands 
life-saving surgery. The search for common ground in the draft texts, in May 2010, 
failed to open any space that would lead to a successful conclusion. The WTO 
continues to tread water, unable to build a development perspective into the 
existing texts of the Chairs to forge a consensus. Pascal Lamy, Director General of 
the WTO, has admitted that there is no way, “to structure and steer discussions 
amongst 150 plus members in a manner conducive to discussion.” So what is next 
for this member-driven organization? How should it redefine its mission? Where to 
now?  
 
Governments and global civil society face four possible outcome scenarios of the 
current trade negotiations. All have implications for a modern trade policy so it is 
essential to understand better where this beleaguered organization is possibly 
heading. 
 
6.1. Scenario 1 Functionality Restored 
For the WTO, the most attractive scenario is that the deeply divided membership 
revive the Doha Round mandate and bring it to a successful conclusion heeding 
Lamy’s call to make a final effort to cut a deal. The hope that new market access 
will become an engine of growth is a strong incentive forcing major countries back 
to the bargaining table with a smaller-oriented development package. The 
elimination of all export subsidies and the substantial reduction in domestic support 
by 2013, as hoped for by the Cairns group of agricultural countries, must be set 
aside for less ambitious goals that are more in line with a Doha-lite agreement.  
 
The emphasis on fairer trade is a key demand for developing countries and the 
suspended talks would get an injection of political will if the Doha negotiators made 
fairer trade the centrepiece of the Round. Critically, the United States, European 
Union, and China must recommit to global free trade while, in return, India, China, 
and Brazil accept a deal on agriculture, intellectual property rights and lower tariffs 
though with much reduced ambition from the earlier starting point. The United 
States will cut subsidies to its farmers deeper than previously offered. India and 
China will accept market opening for some key industries and tariff reduction in 
telecommunication and chemicals. Significantly there will be more opt outs and 
side-deals, particularly in agriculture, and the global south will obtain the special 
safeguard mechanism they wanted. Exemptions for many global south countries 
with more than fifty percent of their populations in rural agriculture will be built into 
the texts.  
 
One innovation is that rule of reciprocity-based bargaining will be modified in some 
instances to allow global south countries to gain larger benefits from the round. 
Some modest progress will be made on biodiversity and geographical indicators. 
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More plurilateral agreements can be anticipated in the future, possibly with respect 
to public health and the environment. They are difficult to organize but the idea 
that a critical mass of countries can sign an agreement and others will come aboard 
later has its champions. But the legal straight jacket of the single undertaking 
remains the founding principle of the organization. If anything, the legal culture of 
the WTO will emerge stronger at the expense of the informal process of trade 
diplomacy. 
 
Likelihood: It is doubtful that this scenario has any chance of success. The United 
States, European Union, and India cannot agree on the most contentious issue of 
subsidy cuts to agriculture, and India and other countries do not accept the 
unreasonable ceilings placed on the proposed safeguard mechanism. Other 
imbalances are slowing down the institutional reform of the WTO. The tightening of 
fiscal policies in Europe, the sharp decline of the exchange rate against the dollar as 
well as tepid Eurozone growth make the likelihood of any deal much more difficult; 
reinforcing the belief that the WTO is less relevant as a governance institution.  
 
Lamy’s repeated appeals for ‘greater ambition,’ not surprisingly, have fallen on deaf 
ears. The structural imbalance between surplus and deficit economies demands a 
bolder step for global macro-economic reform. It is likely that emerging markets 
will continue to accumulate large foreign surpluses as growth is much faster in 
developing countries compared to the global north.4 If Fred Bergsten is right and 
these new imbalances threaten a global recovery, they will provoke strong political 
reaction in the Obama Administration (Bergsten, 2010). Against this backdrop of 
the sovereign debt crisis and record high unemployment, every indication is that 
Washington will not assume its old role as consumer and borrower of last resort. It 
will not push Congress to wrap up the stalled Doha Round.  
 
Implication: If a deal was reached, it would close the door on the current debate 
about the WTO’s future. Compared to the World Bank and IMF, which have 
distanced themselves from the former neoliberal, privatization agenda, there would 
be no uptake for the WTO to reform its rules and broaden its trade agenda to 
function differently or embed a development agenda in the core understandings of 
the organization.  
 
6.2. Scenario 2 Trade Pause 
With the deep divisions between the global north and south, a trade pause scenario 
may be attractive for countries left exposed to the global economic crisis. The 
principal idea behind an extended suspension of negotiations is that, at present, the 
negotiations collapse because common ground in key areas such as agriculture, 
intellectual property rights, and non-agricultural sectors such as chemicals is 
shrinking. There are simply too few bridges to span the negotiating divides. 
                                                 
4 In 2010, China has a saving rate of 38 percent compared to the paltry 3 percent for U.S. consumers. 
The challenge will be to force Chinese families to abandon thrift for mass consumption and to find a way 
to entice profligate U.S. consumers to return to their spendthrift ways. So far, no economic theory can 
explain shifts in consumer norms and practices. It is expected that the current account deficit in the 
United States will exceed $800 billion, the record of 2006. Investor appetite post-Greece crisis is to buy 
United States Treasury securities to finance the American deficits. 
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Currently, U.S. negotiators prefer ‘no deal to a bad deal,’ and China, with its 
informal preferential trading system with Latin America, Asia and Africa, 
recognizing the advantages to putting negotiations on the back burner, tacitly 
supports the idea of the pause. The European Union finds much to support in a 
trade pause that leaves its social market protected from any new de-regulatory 
pressures. Very large spending cuts and tax increases in the European Union have 
made the Eurozone wary about any deal that would result in a flood of low price 
goods from China and other low cost producers. The threat of further job losses to 
the Eurozone from southern producers is seen as an unacceptable risk to 
communities and industries struggling to cope with the harsh conditions of a very 
modest recovery.  
 
The global south, having mastered the intricacies of complex, reciprocal concession 
bargaining, is unqualifiedly likely to support a trade pause. Mini-lateralism offers 
them a regional alternative to the stalled Doha round. Their command of technical 
expertise has changed the dynamics of negotiations and given the global south new 
confidence to challenge U.S. and E.U. dominance in the bargaining process. To a 
degree that was absent in previous rounds, its trade negotiators have learned how 
to calculate the consequences of a deal on farmers in rural India, China, Indonesia 
and sub-Saharan Africa, and the risk of displacing millions of people outweighs the 
benefits of liberalizing agriculture at the present time (Tussie 2009). With no 
consensus on the horizon, the trade pause is a very attractive scenario with low 
political cost, though problematic. Given the new dynamics of power, it creates 
many uncertainties for the future of the WTO. If it is on life support many members 
will take it as a legitimacy crisis which would add greatly to its current institutional 
gridlock.  
 
Likelihood: This scenario is the most probable. The questioning of market-based 
efficiency is well documented in the literature on trade and development and is 
centered on two ideas. First, at the beginning of the millennium, neither Marxist 
dependency theory nor liberal economic theory foretold the rise of the BRICS and 
such large-scale development. Their share of global GDP has overtaken that of 
advanced capitalist economies. Their real GDP growth has been without precedent 
in modern annals. The ‘big emerging economies’ have not only caught up but are 
now in overdrive compared to the anaemic performance of the United States and 
the European Union. In 2006, The Economist reported that half of the world’s 
industrial products were produced in the global south, and according to the newest 
research, within a decade, 20 percent of the Fortune 500’s firms will be southern 
multinationals (Drache and Froese, 2008). Secondly, for many emerging economies 
not part of the BRICs, the high cost of an export-driven strategy is that it leads to 
overspecialization in a handful of goods. Over-concentration in a single market or a 
group of countries has created new structural problems for many southern 
economies and with it increased vulnerability to highly unstable global commodity 
markets.  
 
Implication: An extended trade pause could be the trigger that forces the WTO to 
redraw the line between trade and non-trade issues, and develop new processes 
and practices. The modality would be the establishment of a high-powered 
Commission very different from the failed Sutherland Commission and closer to the 
Warwick Commission with its wide-angled analysis of global change. The WTO 
would then have to consider different kinds of reforms to its rules and norms, and 
more particularly to the role of its executive and legislative arms (Sauvé, 2007). 
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6.3. Scenario 3 Messy Multilateralism 
Richard Haas (2010) has coined the term ‘messy multilateralism’ to grapple with 
the fact that the world is too complex. There are too many countries at the table to 
strike large legal agreements when each sovereign state gets a vote. Democratic 
multilateralism is often a recipe for doing nothing as the Doha Round makes 
abundantly evident. Moises Naim (2009) has given legs to the idea of strategic, 
targeted, plurilateral deals arguing that smaller deals and agreements are the only 
practical solution to address the world governance crisis. Naim argues for 
abandoning ‘the grand bargain’ as a house of mirrors and a fool’s paradise of 
failures. Deals could involve, he says, the top twenty global traders, or the top 20 
polluters or the 20 sub-Saharan countries most in need who would be invited to the 
table to make smaller, exclusive deals that others can join later on. All this 
requires, he emphasizes, “is the smallest number of countries needed to have the 
greatest impact in solving a particular issue.”  
 
Mini-multateralism would be criticized for being anti-democratic and exclusive he 
argues, but in a world that needs to put a premium on pragmatic problem-solving 
and moving the envelope forward, it should be apparent that countries are already 
practicing mini-multilateralism regionally and, in the absence of an inter-state 
consensus, are very keen to sign preferable trade agreements. Mini-deals are open 
to any country and are a functional alternative to the deadlocked Doha Round. 
Another advantage is that they are a highly attractive alternative for a multi-polar 
world with sharply divergent agendas. If countries cannot build credible long-term 
policies with consensus, they need to abandon this kind of outdated thinking for 
plurilateral deals requiring only a critical mass to come into effect. 
 
Likelihood: This option appeals to the newfound confidence of the global south. 
Nora Lustig and Luis Lopez-Calva recently tested the proposition that a rising tide of 
trade lifts all countries that have significant numbers of citizens living at or below 
the poverty line by analyzing declining inequality in Latin America between 2000 
and 2006. Their findings are significant because although inequality continues to be 
a dominant reality in Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, and Peru, out of seventeen Latin 
American countries for which data are available, twelve experienced a decline in the 
GINI coefficient. The largest decrease in the earning gap occurred in countries with 
equalizing contributions and government transfers to the poor. In Argentina, Brazil 
and Peru, these kinds of redistribution initiatives targeted the upgrading of skills 
and broadening access to education. The report underscores the fact that making 
public spending and taxes more progressive and improving the quality of public 
services for the poor, especially in education, is a key measure to keeping society 
on the path towards greater equality of opportunity (Lustig and Lopez-Calva, 2010, 
6). 
 
In another recent report, the North-South Institute documents the failure of the 
trade liberalization model to benefit the least developed countries. Countries such 
as Mali, Mozambique, and Sudan send 55 to 80 percent of their total exports to a 
single country. Exceedingly high levels of partner concentration in exports are 
evident in the cases of Bangladesh, Bolivia, Colombia, Ghana, and Honduras. 
Continued reliance on this model has pitfalls – on the export side, almost all of 
these countries are vulnerable to cost volatility due to their dependence on 
importing energy. The earnings from their ‘so-called’ success in single agricultural 
commodities often add up to 15 percent of the total cost of imports. The essential 
problem is that many developing countries cannot afford to consume imported 
goods and services at the rate needed to function effectively (Heidrich and Weston, 
2010, p.40). 
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Developing countries have learned to support strategies that make it easier to 
move up the value added chain by transitioning from producing raw materials to 
processing agricultural and manufactured products rather than supporting 
strategies driven by the free trade model. Rules need to be asymmetric, but in 
Stiglitz’s words, “asymmetric in the precisely opposite way to …the present 
configuration that discriminates against developing countries” by preventing them 
from developing their own institutional response to the need for competitive, 
redistribution strategies. In the nineties, East Asian countries intervened in their 
markets and used a variety of means, including subsidies and capital controls, to 
grow faster than many Latin American governments that relied on unfettered 
neoliberalism (Stiglitz, 2006).  
 
This diagnostic framework is encouraging global south countries to experiment with 
pluralistic, highly diverse strategies tailored to actual conditions. Unprepared to 
wait for the reform of international institutions, they have already taken on new 
roles at the global level, most importantly in the G20. While not without its critics, 
the G20 has become more inclusive and representative of the new geometry of 
global power.  Of course, it is too early to predict whether mini-multilateralism will 
replace the multilateral system as a forum for global governance, but it is likely to 
remain the WTO’s chief rival and competitor for the near and mid-term future. 
 
Implication: The reconfiguration of the world trading system into a more 
fragmented and regionally anchored proliferation of regional agreements will leave 
a legal gap for the near future. The unwinding of multilateralism will generate new 
trade fictions and stress test the WTO’s dispute settlement mechanism. The 
fragmented nature of national sovereignty requires that democratic politics be 
carried to the global level. As countries shift their attention to creating domestic 
policy space to maintain social peace and stimulate economic growth, a global 
architecture that is more sensitive to the developmental needs of rich and poor 
countries alike will eventually emerge. 
 
6.4. Scenario 4 Institutional Break-up 
If tensions become too great to manage, one or more of the major countries may 
decide to disinvest in the WTO and disengage itself from the Doha Round.  Any 
such decision would lead to a decline in the credibility of the talks and the WTO 
itself. The Marrakesh Agreements enable a member to withdraw on sixty days 
notice but no country Steger reminds us has ever quit the organization. (Steger, 
2007)  A country would not have to leave definitively but could simply decide to 
disengage itself politically from the Round. For instance they could minimally 
participate in the negotiation process and committee work.  Frustration with the 
deadlocked round could unleash a backlash against this moribund organization that 
has lost the functionality to negotiate further reductions in tariffs or mutual 
concessions to liberalize trade. Orderly withdrawal from the WTO is messy, and 
legal experts are divided about the feasibility of this option. Steger’s view is that a 
country “cannot withdraw from only one part of the WTO treaty, it must withdraw 
from the WTO Agreement as a whole”, and that works as an effective deterrent 
even against the most stout-hearted (Steger, 2007, 491).  Given that the WTO is a 
binding international treaty and unlike a commercial contract that a country can 
cancel whenever it is expedient to do so, no country can easily walk away from the 
WTO’s comprehensive legal regime effectively shutting down this option. 
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However the idea of going around the WTO instead of through it is an option for a 
handful of key countries like China, which has complex relations with Africa and 
other developing states. China is making commercial deals that give them strategic 
access to resources in Africa and Latin America. The growth of these preferential 
trade deals certainly is a new development and bears monitoring. De facto they 
create new external pressures and challenged for the world’s multilateral trading 
system. So even if some countries were to quit the organization, the WTO’s legal 
culture and dispute resolution mechanism are likely to survive. The GATT codes 
survived the collapse of the ITO in 1949, the one enduring part of its historic 
legacy. One could imagine the WTO functioning as a shadow of its former self with 
much of its legal regime in trade jurisprudence surviving its demise. (Picciotto, 
2011) 
 
Likelihood: On first glace this scenario is the most improbable, but with the 
collapse of the Doha Round, it is less remote than previously thought. 
 
Implications: The failure to conclude the Doha Round could be a wakeup call 
forcing member states and the WTO to take a serious look at the rules and 
operating procedures. The accumulation of political and market power in the global 
south, the WTO’s hyper-legalism, and all-or-nothing process of bargaining have 
taken their toll on the world’s trading system. The system under siege is providing 
fewer tangible benefits to the developing world, which raises further doubts about 
the ability of the Round to bring greater coherence between trade and 
development. The angst of failure could also fan the flames of popular 
disgruntlement and trigger a much deeper legitimacy crisis of the multilateral 
trading system in the need of signicant reform.  
 
7. Unilateral Trade Liberalization Outside the WTO: Fewer Political Costs, 
More Economic Benefits  
Conventional wisdom had long suggested that developing countries required the 
Doha Round to liberalize their economies. In this vein orthodox economists bet on 
the power of reciprocal bargaining to deliver an agreement.  But negotiating 
environment has changed so much and it is no longer certain  that the old model 
deal making is any longer a fruitful tool to close a deal. Many developing countries 
aren’t waiting to cut their tariffs on the outcome of reciprocity based bargaining. 
According to the World Bank’s Global Economic Prospects report in 2005, as much 
as two-thirds of the tariff cutting by a large sample of developing countries was due 
to unilateral reforms. Cutting tariffs unilaterally had the advantage for many 
southern countries of substantial economic gains with no political costs. Simon 
Evenett (2007) calculated the costs of the Round’s failure for China, India, and 
Brazil. China and India effectively lose a trifling three days’ GDP growth while Brazil 
loses one to three months’ growth. The accompanying table on real global income 
gains from the Doha Round dramatically illustrates how little is actually at stake in 
reciprocal multilateral trade negotiations for many countries. 
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A Failed Round Doesn’t Cost China Or India Much; Less So For Brazil 
Calculations based on largest 
estimates reported by CEPII 
staff 
 
Calculations based on largest 
estimates by World Bank staff 
 
 
 
 
 
Country 
Estimated gain 
(US $ billions, 
2005) 
Days of economic 
growth needed to 
generate this gain 
Estimated gain 
(US $ billions, 
2005) 
Days of economic 
growth needed to 
generate this gain 
Brazil 1.77 .37 3.90 82 
China -0.61 n.a. 1.70 3 
India 2.70 18 3.50 24 
 Source: Evenett, 2007 
 
Sandra Polaski, formerly with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 
calculated that the original estimate of $500 billion in benefits for developing 
countries has been closer to $40-$60 billion (Wise and Gallagher, 2006). She has 
employed six scenarios using a variety of possible outcomes from moderate 
liberalization in agricultural trade to full liberalization to understand the gains 
better. She makes two fundamental points: first that the gains to global trade from 
a successful Doha Round are quite modest, and secondly, most of the gains go to 
the developed countries. Certainly, the actual proposals do not look very compelling 
as a set of negotiating principles for the global south (see tables Global Income 
Gains from trade scenarios). 
 
Many developing countries rely on tariffs for more than a quarter of their tax 
revenue, and for smaller countries, the number rises to over fifty percent. Wise and 
Gallagher estimate that “the total tariff losses under NAMA [in the Doha 
negotations] could be $63.5 billion, or almost ten times the projected gains” (2002, 
3).  
 
Global Real Income Gains from Trade Scenarios 
Scenarios Gain 
(billions  
of dollars) 
Gain over base  
year GDP 
(Percent) 
(1) Doha Scenario for Agriculture 5.4 0.02 
(2) Doha Scenario for Manufactures 53.1 0.17 
(3) Central Doha Scenario 58.6 0.19 
(4) Central Doha Scenario with “Special Products 
for Developing Countries 
57.7 0.18 
(5) Modest Scenario for Manufactures 38.1 0.12 
(6) Hong Kong Scenario 43.4 0.14 
(7) Limited Scenario for Agriculture 2.9 0.009 
(8) Scenario with Limited Agriculture and 
Ambitious Manufacturing 
56.0 0.18 
(9) Full Liberalization 168.1 0.53 
Source: Polaski, 2006. 
 
According to the WTO website, more than 100 bilateral deals are under negotiation 
around the world. It is no accident that a record number of countries are queuing 
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up to negotiate regional trade deals for their own strategic ends. 5 In over a 
decade, a preferential system of bilateral deals has become a very common. The 
immediate effect has been to undermine the foundational principles of non-
discrimination and national treatment -- the core ideas behind the GATT culture of 
legalism (Dieter, 2009). For Steger “the non-discrimination principles enshrined in 
Articles I and III of the GATT….have become more intrusive norms through their 
interpretation and application by GATT and WTO panels” (Steger, 2002, 141).   
 
8. Article XX: The Long Tortuous History 
Steger’s point, shared by many experts, is that there has been little room for a 
culture of adaptive legal exceptionalism to emerge. In its place, the legal culture of 
the WTO has not allowed broader kinds of policy goals to balance the drive for open 
markets (Picciotto, 2011). Why is this? One answer is that its legal culture has a 
systemic bias against linkage with non-trade issues. For example, the Appellate 
body of the WTO has given only limited reading to the exceptions contained in 
Article XX to protect public health, culture and the environment. Steger and others 
contends that Article XX has a ‘long, torturous legal history’ and the dispute 
settlement bodies have never clarified its scope or recognized their competence to 
interpret the rules in order to equip the organization to face challenges of the new 
economic order (Steger, 2007).  
 
Even the innovative decision in the Asbestos Case rejecting the argument that the 
national treatment principle gave Canada a right to export asbestos-based 
construction products, which are banned in every jurisdiction in Canada as a 
carcinogenic health hazard, did not clarify the grounds on which Article XX could be 
used by states to defend global public health needs (Drache et.al. 2001). Cerny’s 
description of the restructuration process critically reminds us just how far the WTO 
is from recognizing the need for greater institutional coherence between the trade 
and development agenda. Joseph Stigitz and others have made the compelling case 
that social justice has to be part of the WTO’s tool kit, an idea reassuring to a 
political scientist but, so far, not part of the lexicon of trade law (Stiglitz, 2006).  
 
Although Steger notes that the Appellate Body and some of the dispute bodies have 
gone so far as to include the goal of sustainability and development in their 
decisions, unsurprisingly, these decisions have not become part of the “accepted 
theology or culture of the WTO” (Steger, 2007, 486). Instead, the best practice of 
open markets embedded in the WTO’s legal regime remains powerful because it 
underlies the free trade model’s ultimate intent -- to move the world trading 
system towards a private model of wealth creation in which the state adopts a 
market-friendly de-regulatory culture (Kwa, 2007: Khor, 2009). 
  
                                                 
5 In a curious turn of fate, preferential trading agreements (PTAs) “require rules of origin to establish the 
nationality of a product” (Dieter 2009, 397). New non-tariff barriers of one kind or another proliferate. 
The WTO has been unable to minimize the negative effects of regional trade agreements; while the WTO 
membership been unable to reach agreement on the modality for changing the rules to minimize 
negative effects on third party members.  
 
Daniel Drache   Reform at the Top 
 
9. Knowledge Based Bargaining and Institutional Flexibility 
Many scholars and critics are attracted to the notion of institutional flexibility as the 
path to reform. However, the global south remains unconvinced of this, for the 
moment, particularly if such change would make the WTO more intrusive. Instead, 
they have channelled their energies into mastering the negotiating rules and 
learned to change the bargaining dynamics through knowledge-based bargaining to 
employ Diana Tussie’s apt phrase. Coalitions are results-driven and groups such as 
the G20, G33, the Cotton Group, and the Core Group have used south-oriented 
public policy and political economy successfully to push back on the Singapore 
Issues that include competition policy and other very difficult issues.  
 
Tussie’s fundamental insight is that the global south has been technically 
empowered by knowledge-based bargaining (2009). The shift in policy focus from 
traditional border barriers to domestic, regulatory, and legal systems has hardened 
the resolve of the coalitions to reject their traditional role as rule takers as they 
were in the Uruguay Round. Instead, they have become ‘refuseniks’ with respect to 
the need to offer reciprocal concessions where the gains of one sector are traded 
off against heightened import competition in another sector. This model of 
bargaining worked reasonably well between developed countries where 
governments used subsidies and non-tariff barriers to soften the costs of 
adjustment. However, when the negotiations directly involve the survival of 
hundreds of millions of peasants, as they do for the emerging economies of the 
global south, the concession model of trade bargaining breaks down. What is new 
in this round is the politicization of issues such as access to generic drugs and price 
supports for the millions of farmers who live on $2 a day or less. Tussie 
persuasively argues that the free trade-protectionist binary influences the global 
south less than the pragmatics of protecting their domestic policy space.  
 
The WTO membership has yet to address the call for new governance arrangements 
with explicit development provisions. In the last two decades, civil society and other 
critics have demanded greater openness and participation in decision making at the 
WTO (Deere-Birkbeck, 2009). While some progress has been made in this direction, 
it is likely that the calls for greater accountability are little more than rhetoric. 
  
10. The Million-Dollar Question: What Does The Global South Want? 
For more than 80 years, the GATT has defined the legal culture of trade and 
investment, and its dispute mediation has given it legitimacy even as the 
multilateral system suffers from legislative gridlock (Sauvé, 2007). The 
multilateralism of the future is one in which “developing countries will be able to 
flexibly assess and adopt various policy models, approaches, and mixes in support 
of their goals.” In her far-reaching paper, Rethinking the Trading System, Aileen 
Kwa (2007) outlines the guiding principles that would change the trading system 
and rebalance power between the big players in the global market. In this system, 
“there must be checks and balances in the power of the biggest players.” Her idea 
of adopting human rights as the underlying rationale for the functioning of the 
trading system would radically alter multilateralism as we know it.  
 
It is too early to say whether investing in human development and re-localizing and 
broadening the developmental prospects of national economies would stave off 
further decline of the world trade authority. The most important lesson to take from 
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Kwa’s analysis of the world trade organization is that opposition to aggressive 
market opening and the demand for deregulation of national economies is not a 
passing phenomenon. Far from it. From the outside, the committees still meet and 
members parse every word to the umpteenth draft. In the negotiation world of 
giving little and squeezing your trade rival the negotiation environment has 
dramatically altered in ways that no one could predict. There can be no return to 
the club model of the Uruguay Round where the few decided for the many, and the 
WTO will continue to be stalemated because there is no effective decision-making 
mechanism available to complete the Doha Round and broaden its non-trade 
agenda. Therefore, the great issues of the moment – human rights, the 
environment, poverty eradication – will not figure into its governance lexicon.  
 
11. The Bias of Membership Organizations: An Innate Conservatism? 
This paper has argued that the dynamics of power and the way the WTO conducts 
its business have changed beyond recognition. Still the riddle inside the paradox is 
that membership organizations, like the WTO, are strongly biased towards the 
status quo and all of its defects and shortcomings. Frequently global membership 
organizations are conservative, top-down organizations deeply divided and 
fragmented by competing national interests. Still countries have learned from the 
past and are not ready for a trade war with mile high tariffs. So despite a feeble 
recovery in leading industrial economies, the old demon of classical protectionism is 
largely confined to the margins where it belongs (Drache, 2010).    
 
In terms of what is next for the WTO, a trade pause is the most likely scenario. We 
have also insisted that international organizations like the WTO need to be able to 
evolve and adapt to structural change whether incrementally or by some near-
death experience. If they cannot do so, then global governance institutions lose 
their way and their influence on the global economy radically declines. Scholars and 
experts have compiled a very long list of the most egregious institutional boulders 
that have pushed the WTO off course. There is no epistemic consensus on which of 
these has had the most damaging effect but these explanations are worth recalling 
just briefly. These include: the one-size-fits-all free trade model (Rodrik, 2002), the 
divisiveness of intellectual property rights and agriculture as deal breakers (Ismail 
2009), the power dynamics of club versus coalition bargaining dynamics (Narlikar 
2010), the absence of policy coherence (Blouin 2007), the paradigm shift in the 
climate of ideas (Ostry 2002), the ‘rise of the rest’ hypothesis (Zakaria 2008), 
mountain-sized institutional rigidities (Matoo and Subramanian 2008), EU-US power 
rivalry (diverse authors), troubled multilateralism (Bhagwati 2005; Stiglitz 2006), a 
declining interest in trade liberalization (the new Obama administration), pushy 
new actors with transnational social networks (Kwa 2007), the pull of regionalism 
(diverse experts), weak problem-solving capacity (Picciotto 2007), the uncertainty 
of looming regime change (Hefler, 2004), institutional over-reach without reform of 
the WTO legal culture (Khor 2009), the need for new institutional structures and 
practices (Steger, 2007) and the success story of new policy spaces and second 
best institutions (Rodrik, 2007). The only thread of a consensus among such 
divergent scholars is that they are unanimous on one point: the WTO is a troubled 
institution facing the prospects of decline. 
 
A decade ago, the WTO was one of the pole stars of the triumphant globalization 
movement; regarded by critics and supporters alike as the most powerful global 
governance institution because of its legal muscle. Since the moral victory of the 
legalists has imploded, the legalization of global politics is itself on trial. The shifting 
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power of geography encourages countries to look for new frames in which to pursue 
their strategic interests. Is it far-fetched to suppose that Keynes and Prebisch have 
much more to teach us about the institutions and norms of global governance than 
the uncoordinated market capitalism of Hayek and Friedman (Skidelsky, 2009)? 
The transition from the club dominated by the US and EU to the coalition model of 
trade governance of the many is the clearest indication of the slow decline in the 
status and effectiveness of this world trade organization. In the future, it will likely 
have a smaller institutional reach and less legal clout although the legal 
adjudication function will operate in much the same way as it has for technocratic 
efficiency-based reasons. 
 
Pessimists predict a hard landing for the Doha Round reflecting the new power 
relations in Geneva and beyond. Optimists envisage a different kind of global trade 
institution, one in the mirror image of the emergent balance of power taking shape 
in this highly focused global governance institution. Both may be right for reasons 
of timing and sequencing. Deadlock is a state of impasse where in modern 
organizational theory neither side has the authority and sufficient clout to impose 
its will on the other. As the multilateral trading system continues to be without 
coherent direction, trade negotiations are a second order difficulty in a global 
economy hard pressed to sustain a strong recovery.  
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